Professor Kristof Titeca’s analysis in Democracy in Africa, titled “Has Muhoozi taken power in Uganda?”, captures the drama of recent weeks on the surface: the political neutralization of former Speaker Anita Among, the high-profile detentions of Erias Lukwago and Miria Matembe, Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s public posting of images from operations, explicit threats and the subsequent closure of Nation Media Group outlets, and the installation of a new Speaker aligned with the Patriotic League of Uganda.
Prof. Titeca interprets these as evidence that “the personalised decision-making structure has increasingly spiraled out of President Museveni’s hands, with Muhoozi playing a central role,” and that “the concentration of power, the willingness to use it, and the brazenness of it all point to concerning and troubling times ahead.” He further frames the pattern as potentially “a slow coup” or “a coup by other means,” in which formal institutions have become irrelevant and authority now resides decisively with Muhoozi and PLU.
The foregoing observations identify real tensions and mostly legitimate anxieties. They do not, however, establish that Muhoozi has seized power or that constitutional order has collapsed. A closer reading of Uganda’s constitutional design, the explicit record of presidential authorization in the very events cited, the institutional record since the January 2026 elections, and the deeper logic of long-term state consolidation reveals instead a stress test of a mixed polity that remains intact and is, in key respects, being fortified.
Uganda’s 1995 Constitution, forged from the ashes of prior collapse, deliberately concentrates executive authority while embedding checks. Article 98 designates the President as Head of State, Head of Government, and Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces. Article 99 vests executive authority in the President, to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and laws. The Chief of Defence Forces serves at the President’s pleasure and operates within the chain of command. These are not decorative provisions; they establish that actions by the CDF, however publicly visible or operationally autonomous in execution, derive their legitimacy from and remain ultimately accountable to the President.
Prof. Titeca notes that Muhoozi “was explicit that he ordered the closure of the media house – with consent from his father.” The government subsequently attributed the action to a security inquiry directed by the President. Far from demonstrating that “the government or parliament doesn’t seem to matter any more,” these statements confirm the opposite: the decisive authority remains presidential. What appears as “brazenness” on social media is more accurately read as transparent operational new age signaling by a subordinate commander operating with unprecedented explicit higher authorization. In an era of instantaneous communication, such visibility does not constitute a new centre of sovereignty; it reflects the deliberate choice of a force largely composed of millennials and Gen-z to project resolve while remaining within the established hierarchy. In other words, this is Delegation, Not Abdication!
Prof. Titeca observes that, as President Museveni has aged, important decisions have been delegated to trusted figures. This is not evidence of loss of control but of its pragmatic exercise. Effective sovereignty in a complex state requires precisely such delegation to competent agents who share the leader’s strategic vision. President Museveni has practiced this at every stage for decades: professionalizing the military, liberalizing the economy, managing regional and ethnic coalitions, and steering the country through multiple transitions without fragmentation.
The post-2024 consolidation of Muhoozi’s role as CDF, including promotions, reshuffles, and anti-corruption measures within the forces, represents the continuation of that long-term project of building a capable, loyal, and modernized security institution under ultimate civilian (presidential) command. It could also be how President Museveni perceives loyal continuity at this period of time as most of the comrades he came out of the bush with him have grown old alongside him. Museveni is not the kind who believes institutions (independent or not) would deliver revolutionary continuity. This is a weakness or strength — depending on who you talk to. Why he seems or deliberately so to have picked Muhoozi who also happens to be his son is a legitimate question mark for the many not the few. And when he speaks this Saturday or sometime in future he will have to candidly address it. The nation is waiting.
Even then, the cabinet appointments after the January 2026 elections, which Titeca himself notes contained fewer Muhoozi/PLU figures than anticipated and retained significant influence for close Museveni allies and Saleh-associated figures, further illustrate that the President retained decisive say over the composition of government.
Recent parliamentary approval of the UGX 84.3 trillion national budget for FY 2026/2027, with its emphasis on monetization, infrastructure, agricultural value addition, and human capital, demonstrates that core state functions continue to operate through established constitutional channels. These are not the hallmarks of a “slow coup” but of orderly, if contested, consolidation within a dominant-party system that has been resilient.
The detentions of Lukwago and Matembe, and the broader pattern of security operations, raise serious and legitimate questions about proportionality, due process, and the dignity of citizens—particularly an elder stateswoman such as Matembe. These concerns must be addressed rigorously. Yet the fact that several figures have been granted bail and appeared before courts indicates that judicial oversight has not been suspended. The Constitution’s Bill of Rights (Chapter Four), including protections for personal liberty, freedom from torture or degrading treatment, presumption of innocence, and fair hearing, remains the operative legal framework.
Where excesses occur, the remedy lies in strengthening internal accountability mechanisms—clear operational guidelines, prompt investigation of complaints, and transparent reporting—precisely as President Museveni has directed on multiple occasions: that torture is unnecessary, counterproductive, and prohibited.
The media measures, however abrupt, were publicly tied by Muhoozi himself to presidential consent and later framed by government as part of a security inquiry under presidential direction. Negotiations between the CDF and Nation Media Group executives have reportedly begun. While the speed and public character of the action understandably alarmed observers, the existence of regulatory processes and ongoing dialogue points to an enforcement episode within the state, not the replacement of the state by a personal junta. Swift movement toward predictable, rule-based resolution would best serve both press freedom and institutional mutuality.
The suggestion of a “slow coup” or “military junta with a PR team” does not withstand scrutiny against observable indicators. A coup, even incremental, would typically involve suspension or abrogation of the Constitution, dissolution or neutering of Parliament, mass purges of non-aligned senior officers and officials, and the emergence of a new sovereign authority claiming legitimacy outside the prior order. None of these has occurred. Parliament continues to legislate and approve budgets. The judiciary, while criticised for pace in some matters, has not been dismantled. The military remains under the constitutional Commander-in-Chief. Economic management proceeds, with growth holding in the 6.3–6.4 percent range in recent periods and IMF projections indicating acceleration toward 7.5 percent in 2026 as oil production ramps up. International engagement continues through established diplomatic channels.
Internal first-family commentary—Odrek Rwabwogo’s public expression of concern, Natasha Museveni’s video message, and reported advice attributed to Salim Saleh—reveals contestation and debate within the broader political family, not the silencing of all alternative voices. Such dynamics are characteristic of succession-adjacent periods in long-ruling systems; they are being managed, not suppressed into uniformity.
President Museveni’s relative public silence on operational details is consistent with a leadership style that has long distinguished strategic direction from tactical execution, reserving ultimate authority while empowering capable lieutenants. He has announced that he will speak on Saturday. We wait! Hope he will characteristically not evade us!
Aristotle’s analysis in The Politics remains instructive: the most stable constitution is a mixed polity that combines monarchical decisiveness, aristocratic competence and counsel, and democratic consent and accountability, thereby preventing any single element from degenerating into tyranny or mob rule. Uganda’s 1995 Constitution embodies such a mixture. The present tensions test its balancing mechanisms rather than demonstrating their failure.
Hobbes warned that without effective sovereign capacity, society reverts to the war of all against all—a condition Uganda escaped after 1986 through the very leadership and institutional project now being stress-tested.
Locke and Montesquieu emphasised consent, separation, and the rule of law as essential constraints. These constraints are not absent; they are being invoked, sometimes loudly, precisely because the constitutional order retains enough vitality for critique and correction to occur.
Uganda’s people and economy supply further ballast. Rural communities in Kigezi, Wakiso, and across the country continue to drive production in coffee, bananas, livestock, and emerging value chains. The Parish Development Model and infrastructure investments aim to translate macro growth into broad-based opportunity.
The forthcoming oil revenues, if managed transparently through appropriate sovereign mechanisms, can accelerate diversification without the classic resource curse—provided institutions perform their oversight functions.
The legitimate anger provoked by excesses and the narrowing of civic space is not manufactured; it reflects lived memory of past abuses and a rightful demand for procedural fairness.
The appropriate response is not external alarmism that undermines confidence, but internal discipline: rigorous adherence to constitutional procedures in arrests and detentions; prompt, transparent investigation of complaints through bodies such as the Uganda Human Rights Commission; expedited judicial handling of bail and habeas corpus applications; and clear, predictable regulatory processes for media and expression. International partners can usefully support judicial and security-sector capacity-building while respecting sovereignty and recognising Uganda’s record of peacekeeping contributions and regional diplomacy.
Parliament must exercise robust oversight. The judiciary must deliver timely, impartial justice. Security agencies must internalise the presidential directives against torture and for professional, evidence-based methods. The executive, under President Museveni’s continuing strategic direction, must ensure that decisiveness serves institutional strengthening rather than personal or factional consolidation. These outcomes are attainable because the foundations are not illusory. The events of recent weeks, however unsettling, have occurred within a constitutional order that has already demonstrated greater resilience than its critics allow.
President Museveni’s record of balancing factions, professionalising the security sector, and advancing development remains the central stabilising fact. The people of Uganda—entrepreneurial, communal, and determined—supply the enduring energy. When institutions channel ambition through law and accountability, the republic endures and renews.
Uganda stands at a demanding but navigable juncture. The task is not to pretend that tensions do not exist, but to resolve them in fidelity to the Constitution that has carried the country this far. In doing so, Uganda will demonstrate that strong, tested leadership and institutional deepening are not opposites but mutually reinforcing. The foundations, though stressed, remain intact and capable of supporting a more mature, prosperous, and accountable constitutional republic.
Morrison Rwakakamba,
Coffee farmer.
